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Abstract—In this paper we present a novel approach for anonymizing Online Social Network 
graphs which can be used in conjunction with existing perturbation approaches such as clustering 
and modification. The main insight of this paper is that by imposing additional constraints on which 
nodes can be selected we can reduce the information loss with respect to key structural metrics, 
while maintaining an acceptable risk. We present and evaluate two constraints, 'local1' and 'local2' 
which select the most similar subgraphs within the same community while excluding some key 
structural nodes. To this end, we introduce a novel distance metric based on local subgraph 
characteristics and which is calibrated using an isomorphism matcher. Empirical testing is 
conducted with three real OSN datasets, six information loss measures, five adversary queries as 
risk measures, and different levels of k-anonymity. The result show that overall, the methods with 
constraints give the best results for information loss and risk of disclosure. 
Index Terms— privacy, information hiding, graphs and networks 
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
ata Privacy in graphs has recently become a topic of renewed interest by researchers, 
partially due to the emergence of online social networks (OSN), which can be represent-
ed  and analyzed  as graphs. OSN data is of great potential for data analysts from differ-
ent d isciplines, but also represents a threat to data privacy if it is used  for the wrong motives. 
However, anonymization of this type of data represents a challenge, given that anonymization 
techniques may destroy or impair essential structural information in the graph . 
The objective of the current work is to test d ifferent perturbation and selection methods 
under d ifferent conditions to evaluate their relative performance. 
In the literature, some authors have considered  anonymization as a graph partition-
ing/ clustering task based on an overall u tility measure[1] or by modifying nodes using a cost 
function[2].  However, there is less work done to benchmark these d istinct methods together 
and under restricted  conditions. Also, the high cost and/ or complexity of graph search based  
on isomorphic properties, has led  to heuristic d istance based approximate matching methods. 
The authors propose that the latter methods will be appropriate when the adversary 
knowledge is based  on graph topological queries, such as in the present paper, and/ or  when 
the perturbation method is based  on clustering in which case an adversary isomorphic query 
on the local subgraph is ineffective. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we d iscuss the state of the art for the 
issues we are considering in this paper; in Section 3 we present preliminary concepts and 
d iscuss some aspects such as risk due to information leak, the privacy model, the merging 
process and information loss; in Section 4 we describe what is understood as a local neighbo r-
hood subgraph, define the d istance metric, graph alteration operators, restrictions, and finally 
give pseudo-code for the method; in Section 5 we define the metrics used  for information loss 
and adversary knowledge, and define the privacy model; in Section 6 we describe the test 
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mation loss and risk of d isclosure (adversary queries) for three d istinct graph datasets, five 
d ifferent perturbation methods and variants, and d ifferent values of the privacy level k; final-
ly, in Section 8 we present the summary and some conclusions. 
2 RELATED WORK 
The theme of privacy preserving social network publishing is considered  from two general 
perspectives: (i) adversary information and (ii) anonymization methods.  
2.1 Adversary Information 
Adversary information is a way of evaluating the risk of reidentification and normally in-
volves 'attacking' the data with informational queries which take into account the type and  
amount of knowledge available to the adversary. In [1], Hay et al. consider what an adversary 
may know or deduce from a graph in terms of three d ifferent families of topological queries 
(as opposed to isomorphic properties). In general, the queries focus on eliciting information 
about the immediate or close neighborhood of a target node. The first query is called  'vertex 
refinement' , which returns the degree of a target node, of its immed iate neighbors, and so on. 
The second query is called  a 'subgraph query'  and  returns the number of edges of a given 
neighborhood subgraph. The third  query is called  a  'hub fingerprint' , which returns infor-
mation about the proximity of a target node to one or more hub nodes  in the graph. We enter 
into more detail about these three types of information in Section 5.3, given that we use them 
to evaluate risk of d isclosure in the present work. Wondracek [3] presented  a d ifferent ap-
proach, in that the attacker uses a malicious website to obtain information about users of an 
on-line social network.  Backstrom et al. [4] is a key reference for adversary strategies, which 
are d ivided into active attacks, in which the adversary activ ely tries to affect the data to make 
it easier to decipher, and passive attacks, in which the adversary simply ob serves data as it is 
presented . The graph attacked is considered  to be a single anonymized copy of a social ne t-
work, and the adversary queries consider isomorphic properties. In [5], Cheng et al. consider a 
K-Isomorphism approach to privacy preserving network publication which protects against 
structural attacks. The authors refer to a popular type of attack described by Backstrom et al. 
in [4], which involves the use of embedded subgraphs. They extend this idea by defining two 
realistic attack targets which they call 'NodeInfo' and 'LinkInfo'. They show that k-
isomorphism, or anonymization by forming k pair wise isomorphic subgraphs, is both suffi-
cient and necessary for protection. However, the process is shown to be NP -hard . They pre-
sent some techniques which enhance the anonymization efficiency while retaining the data 
u tility. 
2.2 Anonymization Methods 
In the literature, d ifferent methods have been used for graph anonymization and in particular, 
obtaining k-anonymity of the vertices V in a graph G, while minimizing information loss.  For 
the purposes of the current work we will d ivide the methods into two groups (as has been 
done by several authors in the literature): (a) node modification approaches and (b) node clu s-
tering approaches. In the context of data privacy in  general, Sweeney's paper [6] was the first 
to define k-anonymity, and more recently the paper by De Capitani et al. [7], gave key defin i-
tions for privacy levels, information loss and risk of d isclosure. In [8] Zhou considered  l-
d iversity together with k-anonymity to give a stronger anonymity guarantee. 
2.2.1 Node modification approaches 
Node modification approaches act by choosing similar nodes and making them identical. 
This can be done by ad ding nodes to make their degrees the same and by adding edges to  
make their immediate neighborhood connectivity the same. Using this method, k-anonymity 
is achieved by obtaining that every node in the graph has at least k -1 other nodes which are 
indistinguishable from it. Zhou[2] presents a method which selects nodes based on a cost 
function and then anonymizes them by adding nodes and edges to their neighborhoods. As 
well as anonymizing the topology, it generalizes the vertex labels. The topological aspect re-
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lies on an elaborate coding scheme to speed up isomorphic comparisons between subgraphs. 
In [9], Nettleton et al. compare two different types of online social network from a data priv a-
cy perspective, using 'add link' as the perturbation operator. In [10], Hay et al. presented  a 
simple graph anonymization based on random addition and deletion of edges. The attack 
method attempts re-identification using two types of queries, vertex refinement and sub-
graph knowledge. The risk measure is considered  as the percentage of nodes whose equiv a-
lent candidate set falls into one of a given set of buckets (1 node, 2-4 nodes, 5-10 nodes, ...). In 
[11], Das et al. present a linear programming-based technique for anonymization of edge 
weights by scrambling the relative ordering of the edges sorted  by weights,  which preserves 
the linear properties of the graph. 
2.2.2 Node clustering approaches 
Node clustering approaches act by choosing similar nodes and physically grouping them. 
This can be done by a k-means type algorithm or by a similarity/ d istance metric to choose 
similar nodes. Using this method, k-anonymity is achieved by obtaining that every node in 
the graph is incorporated  into a cluster within which there are at least k-1 other nodes. 
Skarkala et al. [12] and Liu  and Yang [13] have recently followed similar approaches for 
node clustering/ grouping which take into consideration the privacy protection of the edge 
weights. Skarkala's method [12] employs a similarity function to form clusters each containing 
at least k nodes. Liu 's method [13], on the other hand, used  a k-means type clustering by calcu-
lating cluster centers. 
Nettleton in [14] applied  a perturbation method based on node aggregation and a similarity 
metric with fixed  weights for choosing node pairs. Different types of clu stering, fuzzy (fuzzy 
c-Means) and crisp (k-Means) are applied  to graph statistical data in order to evaluate the 
information loss due to perturbation. In [15], Nettleton and Torra d efine a set of six graph 
alteration operations for perturbation, and evaluate how each operation affects the graph. The 
graph alteration operations considered  were 'add/ delete' edge, 'add/ delete' vertex and 
'aggregate/ d isaggregate' node.  
In [1], Hay presented  an approach in which nodes are grouped into partitions based  on a 
u tility function incorporating a d istance metric in terms of the number of edges. In order to 
settle the partitions, the entropy is calculated  for the entire graph. However, this process may 
incur a high computational cost, depending on the graph size, topology and characteristics . 
Hay's method[1] is d istinct to our approach given that Hay’s partitions are guaranteed as 
having at least k nodes but can have many more (e.g. hundreds, for k=16), whereas our meth-
od guarantees between k and  2k-1 nodes in each cluster. 
2.2.3 Other approaches 
In [16], Bonchi et al. offer a somewhat d ifferent vision of graph anonymization, d istinguishing 
an entropy-based quantification of anonymity, which they consider a global method, from a 
local quantification based  on a-posteriori belief. They also propose a controlled  random re-
moval edge (as opposed to adding edges) which they call 'random sparsification'. In [17], Ying 
and Wu present a spectrum preserving approach to randomizing social networks. The authors 
base their approach in the observation that  many graph structures have a strong association 
with the spectrum, hence the idea to define a perturbation strategy which minimizes the 
change in some given eigenvalues, while maintaining privacy protection. Zou et al.[18] pro-
pose k-automorphism as an anonymity property to protect against multiple structural attacks 
and develop an algorithm that ensures k-automorphism. 
3 PRELIMINARIES 
A graph is defined as a set of vertices V interconnected  by a set of edges, thus G = (V, E). In 
the current work each node has an arbitrary identifier for data processing pu rposes however 
we assume this identifier will have no meaning for the adversary and cannot be considered  a 
label. Hence, we are dealing with an unlabeled  graph. A local neighborhood subgraph G n = 
(V', E') is a subset of G around a given reference node v r at one hop. Hence v r  V' and all 
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other vertices v'  V' are immediate neighbors of v r.  
In G we define two special sets of vertex types: hubs and bridges. A hub vertex vh is defined 
as being a node with a relatively high number of d irect connections to other nodes, as quanti-
fied  by Kleinberg’s metric [19] which we designate as h(v). We define the set of hub vertices as 
Vh  V, and vh  Vh when h(vh) is in the top 12% percentile of all values for h(v). A bridge vertex 
vb is defined as being a node which has a relatively high number of critical paths which go 
through it to/ from other nodes in the graph, as quantified  by Hwang’s metric [20] which we 
designate as b(v). We define the set of bridge vertices as Vb  V, and vb  Vb when b(vh) is in 
the top 10% percentile of all values for b(v). The top percentile values for hubs and bridges 
were chosen by empirical study of the respective metric d istributions.  
Also we map a partitioning on G derived by the community structure identified  by the 
Louvain Method  [21]. The mapping of the vertices into the community structure can be de-
fined  as a function Gc : v i  c . Hence, a given vertex v i will belong to one and only one com-
munity c. 
The anonymization method  chooses pairs of nodes (v i, v j), based  on a d istance function 
D(v i, v j) and subject to the following restrictions: v i  V
h, v i  V
b, v j  V
h, v j  V
b, Gc (v i) = Gc 
(v j). These three definitions apply the hub, bridge and community restrictions, respectively. 
Possible information leaks: the exclusion of the hub and bridge vertices and the limitation 
to the same community may have information leak consequences to the adversary which are 
compensated  by the reduction in information loss. We assume that we are interested  in pr o-
tecting these three aspects because the user/ analyst is specifically interested  in them from a 
u tility point of view.  
Consider the situation in which a given hub vertex vh with ve edges is excluded from 
anonymization. As we commented  previously, any vertex is the reference node v r of its corre-
sponding local neighborhood subgraph Gn  G. However, the neighbors of hub (and bridge 
nodes), which are not themselves hub or bridge vertices, may be anonymized. Consider the 
case when a neighbor of v h is also neighbor of a vertex which is neither a hub or a bridge ver-
tex in graph G. In this case it will be a cand idate for anonymization. Once the neighbor has 
been anonymized (that is, aggregated  with another node) the resulting 'supernode' will co n-
tinue having a link to the hub node (which has not been anonymized). However, when the 
anonymization process has been completed  for k-anonymity, the hub node, which originally 
had N neighbors will now have N/ k neighbors. Also each neighbor will be a supernode con-
taining at least k original nodes. Hence, although the adversary may be able to identify a given 
hub node, s/ he will not be able to d istinguish between the k original nodes which comprise 
each supernode which is a neighbor v h. Another possible risk is when a given community 
contains a hub node which connects to all (or a high percentage) of the nodes in that comm u-
nity. As mentioned previously, the neighbors of a hub node which are not themselves hubs 
(or bridges) can be anonymized. Hence the community could  be anonymized to k -anonymity, 
with the exception of the hub node. 
Community size guarantee: the Louvain method [21] partitions the complete graph into com-
munities. However, given the restriction that nodes can only be anonymized using other 
nodes from the same community, we have to guarantee th at there are at least k eligible nodes 
in each community, where k is the desired  anonymity level This is achieved by using a higher 
value for the 'resolu tion' parameter of the algorithm (as implemented  in Gephi version 0.8.2-
beta) which controls the community size.     
Hence the true potential information leak for a hub vertex vh will be (| ve+1|  - | ve'| ) /  N , 
where ve' represents the vertices neighbors of v h which may be anonymized with non-hub 
neighbors. The same reasoning also applies for bridge nodes. A worst case scenario would  be 
a community consisting of exactly k nodes of which a high proportion are either hubs or 
bridges. However, by observation, we have seen that in practice the number of hubs and 
bridges in a community tends to be small in relation  to the total number of nodes in the com-
munity. We also note that the number of hubs and bridges excluded from anonymization is 
reduced by selecting only a top percentile of them. This selection process will be explained in 
detail in Section 4.4 of the pap er. 
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In the case of the bridge nodes, these will tend to have a significantly lower degree than the 
hub nodes and therefore the number of potentially affected  nodes (immediate neighbors) will 
be proportionately lower. 
In terms of information leak probability, we consider two aspects: (i) that the number of top 
percentile hub and bridge vertices is small with respect to the number of vertices in the total 
graph, designated  by (| H |  + | B| ) /  N ; and (ii) that in a given community, the number of  
neighbor nodes v i of the hub and bridge vertices (v
h and  vb, respectively) which cannot be 
matched with at least one other non hub or bridge vertex in the same community is also small, 
designed  by | (v i (V
h |  Vb))|  /  | Gn| , where v i is a given node in the immediate local neigh-
borhood subgraph Gn of a given hub node vh or a bridge node v b.  Hence the information leak 
probability will in practice be small and equal to: ((| H |  + | B| ) /  N)  (| (v i (V
h |  Vb))|  /  
| Gn| ). 
The limitation that vertex pairs to be anonymized must be in  the same community also has 
information leak considerations. The size of the community is a factor in this consideration. If 
we have no restriction based on community, then all vertices are candidates. If we have M 
communities with M1N, M2N, …. MnN vertices respectively, we have a corresponding redu c-
tion in candidate d iversity. Also the adversary may be able to calculate the communities given 
that the Louvain method is a public algorithm, and reduce the search space for victim vertices. 
We can formalize the average reduction in candidate d iversity as follows: let N c be the aver-
age number of vertices per community; then N /  N c will be the reduction in d iversity with 
respect to the complete graph, due to the partitioning into communities, which represents the 
potential information leak. As mentioned previously, we can guarantee that there are at least 
k nodes per community, using the "resolu tion" parameter of the Louvain algorithm. 
 Privacy guarantee/model (see also Sec. 5.2): if all N  nodes are anonymized we will obtain 
k-anonymity. Consider a graph G which represents a social network and  G’ which represents 
an anonymized version of G. If G’ is k-anonymous then an adversary who launches structural 
queries cannot re-identify a given vertex from G in G’ w ith a confidence greater than 1/ k. In 
the case of the clustering methods, each super-node in G’ will contain at least k nodes from G, 
hence implementing k-anonymity. However, we take into consideration the aspects explained 
previously in this section with regard  to the nodes (top percentile hubs and  bridges) which are 
excluded from anonymization and the restriction that the node pairs to be merged are in the 
same community. 
We highlight that in the present work we employ an anonymity model for social networks 
such that a graph satisfies k-candidate anonymity if for every structural query over the graph, 
there exist at least k nodes that match the qu ery (the structural queries are defined in Section 
5.3). This is similar to the privacy model of Hay et al. [1] and d istinct from Backstrom's iso-
morphic anonymity [4].  
Nodes excluded from k-anonymization: consider the extreme case, represented  by a k 
value sufficiently large so that all nodes would  be iteratively paired  until no more pairings are 
possible in the anonymized graph G’. Given our restrictions for pairing, we would  have just 
one supernode in each community in G’, together with the hub and bridge nodes excluded 
from pairing. We designate the hub threshold  as h and  the bridge threshold  as b. That is, all 
hubs whose hub metric is greater or equal to h will be included in Vh. Likewise, all bridges 
whose bridge metric is greater or equal to b will be included in Vb. The thresholds are as-
signed empirically, as explained in Section 4.4. The number of hub nodes not anonymized 
would  be | {Vh}|  and the number of bridge nodes not anonymized would  be | {Vb}| , where Vh 
and  Vb represent the sets of non-anonymized hubs and bridges in G’, respectively. The neigh-
bors of the hubs and bridges would  be affected  as we have commented  previously in this 
section. 
Merging process: the merging process is defined as follows: Two vertices v 1 and  v2 are se-
lected  for merging using a similarity function. The set of immediate neighbors of node v 1 is 
defined as V1 = {v11, … v1n} with a corresponding set of links E
1 = {e11, … e1n}. Likewise, the set 
of immediate neighbors of node v 2 is defined as V
2 = {v21, … v2m} with a corresponding set of 
links E2 = {e21, … e2m}. Now, consider that nodes v1 and  v2 are merged to form a new 'super' 
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node, v3. The new set of neighbors V
3 and  edges E3 will be the union of sets V1 with V2 and  E1 
with E2, respectively. In the case that v 1 and  v2 have one or more common neighbors, then the 
resulting set will have correspondingly less edges and vertices than the sum of the original 
sets of edges and vertices. The merging process continues until all eligible nodes have been 










Fig. 1. Merging Process 
In Fig. 1 we see a simple example of the merging process applied  to an initial graph consisting 
of 7 sim ple nodes, one bridge node and one hub node. In the anonymized graph we see that 
the Hub and Bridge nodes have not been aggregated , whereas the remaining 7 nodes have 
been aggregated  into 3 supernodes containing 2, 2 an d 3 original nodes, respectively. Hence, 
this graph has a minimum anonymity of k=2 for the basic nodes. The basic nodes have been 
paired  successively based on a similarity measure in order to minimize the overall perturb a-
tion. 
With respect to the average d egree, in general equilibrium is maintained, given that, on the 
one hand the supernodes have more links than the basic nodes, but on the other hand, there 
are progressively less nodes to link to (determined by the privacy value 'k'). For example, with 
reference to Fig. 1, in the original graph (on the left) the d egree has an average of 2.0 and a 
standard  deviation of 0.89, whereas in the k=2 anonymized graph on the right the correspond-
ing values are 1.6 and 1.0, respectively. 
Information loss: information loss is mitigated  on two levels: (i) we consider a higher level 
in which we protect the community structure of the graph, and the top pe rcentile hubs and 
bridges as key elements of the graph structure; (ii) at a lower level we consider a cost function 
which chooses nodes for clustering/ modification which minimize the perturbation to the 
corresponding local sub-graphs.  The d istance/ cost function and the perturbation methods 
are described in Section 4. In order to quantify the information loss at both levels we use six 
metrics, as described in Section 5.1: degree, clustering coefficient, average path length, hub 
value, bridging centrality value and number of communities, designated  as metrics m1 to m6, 
respectively. In general, if G is the original graph, G'  the perturbed graph, m1 represents the 
degree values for the original graph, m1'  represents the degree values for the perturbed graph, 
then the information loss will be: 
IL(G, G' , m1) = 1 - corr(m1, m1' )    (1) 
The information loss for metrics m2 to m5 would  follow in a similar manner. In the case of m6, 
we take the absolu te d ifference between the number of communities N c in G and  the number 
of communities N c'  in G' , thus:  
  IL(G, G' , m6) = | diff(m6, m6' )|    (2) 
The value obtained from equation (2) can be n ormalized  in order to compare between d iffer-
ent benchmark datasets. 
4 METHOD DESCRIPTION 
We present a method which is based  on selecting the k most similar nodes and then perturb-
ing them to make them identical, either by clustering or by modification. The similarity metric 
approximates an isomorphism matcher and also takes into account the degrees of the neig h-
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bors of the reference node. The local neighborhood sub-graph matching method herein d e-
scribed, has been presented  as a European Patent application[22]. 
The algorithm operates in two phases: (i) a 'training' phase in which the weights are 
learned for the d istance metric from samples and (ii) a 'runtime' phase which processes the 
complete dataset, matching nodes using the trained d istance metric, and  anonymizing them to 
obtain k-anonymity. Two main anonymization methods are used: clustering and modification. 
To these methods we allow two variants: with restrictions and without restrictions. The meth-
ods without restrictions are designated  as having a ‘global’ search capacity. Finally, to the 
restricted  method s, we implement two search variants: ‘local1’ and ‘local2’. The methods and 
variants are summarized  in Table 1, and will be explained in detail in the following Sections. 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF ANONYMIZATION METHODS 
   Search type 
 Name Restrict Global Local1 Local2 
Clustering clust_r_l1 Yes No Yes No 
Clustering clust_r_l2 Yes No No Yes 
Clustering clust_g No Yes No No 
Modific. modif_g No Yes No No 
Modific. modif_r_l2 Yes No No Yes 
4.1 Definition of local neighborhood subgraph 
In order to clearly define what we understand as a ‘local neighborhood  sub-graph, we will 
refer to Fig. 2. In Fig. 2 we see sub-graph G1 whose reference node N 10 has three immediate 
(one hop neighbors) designated  as N 11, N 12 and  N 13. Neighbor N 11 has a degree of four, 
comprised  of two neighbors that are internal to the sub-graph and two neighbors which are 
external to the sub-graph. We note that the external neighbors do not form part of the local 
neighborhood  sub-graph and are only considered  in order to calculate the degree of the 
neighbor nodes of N 10. The internal and external degrees of neighbors N 12 and  N 13 are defined 
in a similar manner. Hence, a local neighborhood  sub-graph around a given target node is 
defined as being comprised  of the immediate neighboring nodes of said  target node and their 











Fig. 2. Two local neighborhood subgraphs 
4.2 Distance metric for similarity based selection 
In the present work, we define a hybrid  approach which adopts some aspects of the partition-
ing approach [1], and other aspects of the cost function approach  [2][11][12]. We effectively 
obtain generalized  partitions which minimizes information loss  by using a similarity function 
to choose node pairs (and their local neighborhoods) for anonymization whose d istance is a 
minimum. Hence, the information loss caused by their perturbation will be proportionately 
minimized . 
We recall that the objective of identifying similar subgraphs (local neighborhoods) is in or-
der to cluster or modify nodes as a mechanism to provide k anonymity. Each subgraph is 
considered  as being the one hop neighborhood around a given node which is to be aggrega t-
ed . Hence, we wish to aggregate node pairs which are as similar as possible, in terms of a 
given set of descriptive characteristics. 
2
ND
 JANUARY 2014 – ARXIV PREPRINT EDITION 
 
In order to calculate the similarity between two node neighborhoods, computation cost is a 
key consideration. Hence we have chosen a similarity metric which calculates a d istance based 
on subgraph characteristics which can be pre-calculated . The subgraph characteristics are: 
degree of the reference node DR; number of edges in the subgraph N E, clustering coefficient 
CC, normalized  average degree of adjacent nodes ADAN, normalized  standard  deviation of 
degree of adjacent nodes SDAN. The first three characteristics are designed to reflect the inte r-
nal structure of the subgraph, whereas the last two characteristics reflect a key characteristic of 
the neighbors (their degree), which effectively considers the neighborhood one hop further 
out (from the reference node as starting point). We observe that in order to perform the calcu-
lation, all values are normalized  against the maximum and minimum correspond ing values in 
the complete graph.  
The objective of the training step is to optimize the weights and obtain a function which 
models an isomorphism matcher/ neighbor degree matcher, but which has a much lower 
runtime computation cost, once we have trained th e weights and pre-calculated  the necessary 
statistical values. 
In order to capture isomorphic and neighborhood characteristics, in a preprocessing step 
we trained the weights of the d istance metric (there is one weight for each characteristic) using 
simulated  annealing and a special isomorphism matcher to calculate the fitness value. We 
have used  the VF2 isomorphism matcher [23], given that it is one of the fastest algorithms 
currently available, and is now widely used  in the graph mining community. We have  
adapted  VF2 so that it also returns a score of how well the respective neighborhood nodes 
maintain their degree values. We call this matcher VF2-D.  
Precision: in terms of the subgraph characteristics, after running 10 fold  training, we o b-
tained 100% test accuracy on the reference node degree value and clustering coefficient of the 
subgraph at one hop, 94% correlation with the neighbor degrees and 97% correlation with the 
number of internal edges of each neighbor. On average, for the test datasets, approx. 70% of 
the top k-1 nodes ranked by the d istance function were isomorphisms. 
4.3 Graph alteration operators – clustering and modification 
In order to compare the relative performance of the r estricted  and non restricted  approaches, 
we have used  two of the most common state of the art techniques in the literature: (i) node 
modification and (ii) node clustering. We note that all the methods use the same node match-
ing function, which is described in Section 4.2.  
Node modification: for this method we have implemented  a technique based on node ad-
dition and edge add ition/ deletion which obtains k-anonymity using a cost function based on 
the expected  perturbation. This method is similar to the one presented  by Zhou in [2]. Due to 
the unavailability of the original code, we have programmed and tested  our own version. The 
implementation uses the d istance measure (see Section 4.2) as the cost function, and selects 
nodes for matching in descending order of degree, as indicated  in [2]. Also, when we add a 
node to increase the degree, we choose them smallest degree first, again following the guid e-
lines of [2]. Finally, edges are added to obtain the same internal degree sequences and mini-
mize the d ifference between the respective sub-graph clustering coefficients. Hence, for node 
modification, two subgraphs SG1 and  SG2 are considered  equal when, for the reference node g 1 
of SG1 and  the reference node g2 of SG2: degree(g1) = degree(g2)  , num_edges(SG1) = 
num_edges(SG2) and  internal_degree_sequence(SG1) = internal_degree_sequence(SG2). As 
mentioned in the introduction and in the privacy model definition (Section 5.2) we apply ad-
versary queries based  on structural similarity of node neighborhoods  [1] rather than on iso-
morphic properties[4]. Hence, this equality criterion is adequate for both the type of adversary 
queries we consider in the current paper, and  in order to compare the relative pe rformance of 
the d ifferent methods under the same cond itions.   
Two versions are implemented: the first has no restrictions so it can choose nodes to match 
anywhere in the graph. We call this 'modif_g'; the second is restricted  by the community, hub 
and bridge nodes, and is called  ‘modif_r_l1’.  The restricted  version will be described in Se c-
tion 4.4. 
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Node clustering: for this method we have implemented  a node aggregation method which 
groups the nodes into supernodes each of which contains at least k and at most 2k-1 of the 
original nodes. An optimum clustering is obtained by using a similarity function (see Section 
4.1) to pair the most similar nodes for aggregation for each k value. Hence, for each node in 
the graph, the k-1 most similar nodes will be identified  as these nodes will un ified  into one 
supernode. If there are 2k or more identical nodes (that is, taking into account that some nod es 
will already be identical in the graph), they will be grouped in supernodes each containing at 
least k nodes and at most 2k-1. Three versions are implemented: the first has no restrictions so 
it can choose nodes to match anywhere in the graph. We call t his 'clust_g'; the second is re-
stricted  by the community, hub and bridge nodes, as described in Section 4.4 and tries to 
match nodes in as local a neighborhood as possible. We call this 'clust_r_l1'; finally, the third  is 
restricted  in the same manner as the second, but can match nodes anywhere within a given 
community. We call this 'clust_r_l2'. The restricted  versions will be described in Section 4.4. 
Hence we have two modification methods, 'modif_g' and 'modif_r_l1' and three clustering 
methods, 'clust_g', 'clust_r_l1' and 'clust_r_l2'. 
4.4 Search restriction variants: 'global', ‘local1’ and 'local2' 
We consider three search strategies: (i) ‘global’ in which nodes can be searched for and 
matched anywhere in the graph; (ii) ‘local1’ in which node search and matching is restricted  to 
the same community and excludes top hub and bridge nodes. This method further restricts by 
trying to find  the best match which is also locally th e closest to the reference node; (iii) ‘local2’ 
in which node search and matching is restricted  to the same community and excludes top hub 
and bridge nodes. In contrast to 'local1', 'local2' can search for nodes anywhere within the 
same community. 
Local1: searches in an expansive manner around the immediate neighborhood of the refe r-
ence node, within the community to which the reference node belongs. It looks for node 
matches whose similarity d istance is within a given threshold   (assigned as the average sim i-
larity for all node pairs in the complete graph). Local2: searches for the best m atch of a given 
reference node, anywhere in the community to which the refer ence node belongs. 
For the restricted  methods we initially execute a “Community Structure” algorithm to pa r-
tition the complete graph into “communities”. We use Blondel’s algorithm, known as the 
Louvain Method [21]. We also identify the top 12% percentile hub nodes and 10% percentile 
bridge nodes by calculating their corresponding metrics. The percentile va lues were chosen by 
empirical study of the metric d istributions. In practice, these top percentile proportions tend  
to represent a small number of key nodes in the graph. 
4.5 Pseudo-code of method 
In this section we define the main procedures which comprise the approach: “Precalculate”, 
"Train" and  "Run" (the latter calls each of the five methods). 
Procedure Main 
Input: original graph G = (V, E), anonymization level k Output: anonymized  graph G’)  
1. Precalculate 
2.     Calculate statistics for each local area subgraph SG1 … SGn 
3.     Calculate bridge and  hub metrics 
4.     Calculate communities c1 … ci using Louvain method  
5. Train 
6.     For each sample s, apply simulated  annealing process to find    
        optimum weights for d istance function 
7. Run 
8.     Let B be the set of bridge nodes b above the bridge  
        percentile threshold  
9.     Let H be the set of hub nodes h above the hub  
        percentile threshold  
10.   Let k be the privacy level 
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11.   FOR EACH (g) ϵ (G) , g B , g H 
12.       Let ci be the community to which node g belongs 
13.       Define SGg1 as the local neighborhood sub- 
            graph for g 
14.       Call methods 
15.           Clustering methods: 
16.               Find  k-1 nodes most similar to g 
‡
 
17.                   clust_r_l1(graph SGg1 , ci,, k)  / / local 1, restricted  
18.                   clust_r_l2(graph SGg1 , ci, k)  / /  local2, restricted  
19.                   clust_r(graph SGg1 , k)           / /  global, unrestricted  
20.                Aggregate the k local neighborhood  subgraphs SGg and   
                                  [SGg2 ... SGgk] by calling  
                     Aggregate(vector of subgraphs[SGg1 ... SGgk]) 
21.           Modification methods: 
22.               Find  k-1 nodes most similar to g 
‡
 
23.                   modif_r_l2(graph SGg1 , ci, k)  / /  local2, restricted  
24.                   modif_r(graph SGg1 , k)           / /  global, unrestricted  
25.               Modify the k local neighborhood subgraphs [SGg2 ... SGgk]  
                    to make them the same as SGg by calling  
                    Modify(vector of subgraphs[SGg1 ... SGgk]) 
26.   END FOREACH  
       
 ‡
Each method  returns the best k-1 matches [SGg2 ... SGgk]   
           that comply with restrictions 
5 METRICS FOR INFORMATION LOSS, PRIVACY LEVEL AND RISK OF DISCLOSURE 
In this Section we give our definitions for information loss and risk of d isclosure. Information 
loss is defined in the habitual manner, as the change in correlation between each variable's 
data in the original file and the perturbed file.  For risk of d isclosure we define a set of 
candidate anonymity queries, similar to those of Hay[1]. 
5.1 Information Loss 
We use six metrics in order to evaluate information loss. The first three are basic grap h statis-
tics (degree, clustering coefficient and  average path length), and  the last three are related  to 
the community structure of the graph (hub metric (HITS), betweenness centrality and number 
of communities). The d istribution of each variable in the or iginal data file is compared (corre-
lated) with that of the same variable in the perturbed file, and the deviation from 1 is the in-
formation loss. 
inf loss1  degree 
inf loss2  clustering coefficient 
inf loss3  average path length 
inf loss4  hub value (HITS) 
inf loss5  bridge value (betweenness centrality) 
inf loss6  number of communities* 
* As calculated  by Louvain method  
We have implemented  the 'cc', 'apl' and  'bridging centrality' algorithms in Java. In the case of 
the 'apl' (average path length) statistic, we have used  Dijkstra's algorithm [24]. In the case of 
hub value (HITS) and betweenness centrality, we have calculated  these using the Gephi 
software[25]. 
Bridge nodes. These are nodes which may not necessary have a high degree but which are 
"strategically" placed between nodes such that they form key part of the graph structure. That 
is, their removal would  cause a major d isruption to the graph structure. It can be considered 
in terms of the number of critical paths which go through it, from/ to other node s (this is 
known as "betweenness centrality". We use the measure published by Hwang et al. in [20], 
called  "bridging centrality", and which is very effective in d istinguishing bridge nodes from 
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hub nodes. 
Hub metric (HITS hub). A hub node is characterized  by having a large number of d irect 
connections to other nodes. In order to quantify the hub value of a node, we have used  the 
popular HITS algorithm, as defined by Kleinberg in [19]. 
Communities. The community partitioning is a key characteristic of the gr aph that we wish 
to maintain. We measure information loss by the number of communities into which the 
graph is partitioned, as calcu lated  by the Louvain method  [21]. 
 
5.2 Definition of Privacy for clustering and modification methods 
The objective of anonym ization is to obtain a given anonymity level of k, as stated  in Section 3. 
As described in Section 4, the clustering algorithm is given the parameter k and  produces a 
graph consisting of supernodes which contain a minimum of k and  a maximum of 2k-1 basic 
nodes. If a supernode reaches a size of 2k nodes, it will be d ivided into two supernodes, each 
containing k nodes. Nodes are grouped based on similarity using the d istance metric d e-
scribed in Section 4.2.  Hence, nodes are grouped into partitions (each containing between k 
and  2k-1 nodes), so that an adversary will be unable to d istinguish between the nodes in a 
partition. The probability that an adversary successfu lly re-identifies a node will be between 
1/k and  2k-1, multiplied  by the number of supernodes created  for the given reference node (we 
note that supernodes are also created  using identical nodes). For the modification algorithm, 
we have implemented  an approximation of Zhou’s method [2] which, for a given node, mod i-
fies k-1 other nodes to make them the same (using our d istance based similarity metric). That 
is, for each node there will be k-1 other nodes with the same degree, number of edges in the 
one hop subgraph, and same clustering coefficient (that is, the connectivity between neig h-
bors). Hence, the probability of an adversary re-identifying a node will be at least 1/k. We note 
that nodes which are already identical will not be modified  and there will probably be nodes 
in the graph which already have more than k identical nodes (especially the low  degree 
nodes).  
As commented  in Section 3, we employ an anonymity model such that a graph satisfies k-
candidate anonymity if for every structural query over the graph, there exist at least k nodes 
that match the query (the structural queries are d efined in the following section). 
5.3 Adversary Knowledge - structural queries 
We follow similar lines to Hay[1] in terms of what the attacker knows or can deduce from the 
graph. Firstly, we consider vertex refinement, as defined by Hay in [1]. Then we consider 
subgraph queries, hub fingerprint and  a new attack we define for the first time in this paper, 
which we will call bridge fingerprint. 
Vertex refinement[1]: H1 (x) returns the degree of x, H2 (x) returns the multi-set of each 
neighbors’ degree, and so on. In general, H i(x) returns the multi-set of values which are the 
result of evaluating H i−1 on the set of nodes ad jacent to x. We consider up to two levels of que-
ry, H1 and  H2 as defined in [1]. 
Subgraph queries[1]: number of edge facts an adversary needs to know in order to identify 
a subgraph around a target node. The subgraph query SG(x) returns the number of edges in 
the subgraph of a node x with its immediate neighbors (1 hop). 
Hub fingerprint[1]: a hub fingerprint query Fi(x, HB) gives a list of the shortest paths from 
node x to each of the hub nodes defined in the vector HB. Hay defines HB as the five highest 
degree nodes for the Enron datasets and the ten highest degree nodes for the Hep -th and Net-
trace datasets. Following Hay[1] we assume that the value i designates the maximum distance 
of visible hub connections. If the shortest path to a hub exceeds the 'visibility horizon' then the 
d istance is assigned value zero (open world  assumption). Hence, query F1(x, HB) returns the 
list for x with a visibility horizon of 1 hop , and  F2(x, HB) returns the list for x with a visibility 
horizon of 2 hops. As an example, consider F2(x, HB), HB = {a, b, c} and a resulting d istance 
vector of {2, 2, 0}. This means that node x is at d istance 2 from hubs 'a' and  'b', and  at a d istance 
greater than 2 (beyond the visibility horizon) from hub 'c'.  
Bridge fingerprint: a bridge is a node which may not have a high degree, but acts as a con-
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nector between a high number of nodes. We can define two types of bridge: (i) local bridges 
which connect hubs, that is, the shortest path between two or more hubs is through the bridge 
node. We can also define a local limit, such as 1 or 2 hops, to the subgraph considered; (ii) 
global bridges through which many shortest paths pass from all over the ne twork.  Given that 
global bridges are much more d ifficult to identify, we will choose local bridges as the finger-
print, given that an attacker will find  it easier to identify the hubs and  the nodes which act as 
bridges between in a local neighborhood. Thus we define a bridge fingerprint query Fi(x, BR) 
which gives a list of the shortest paths from x to each of the bridge nodes defined in the vector 
BR, with a visibility horizon of i. 
6 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
In this Section we describe the datasets used  and the modus operandi of the experiments.  
6.1 Datasets 
We have used  the Ca-HepTh[26], Enron [27] and WikiVote [28] datasets for empirical testing. 
These datasets offer d istinct statistical characteristics and are widely used  in the graph privacy 
literature, which allows other researchers to compare results.  In the remainder of the paper, 
we will refer to these datasets as 'hepth ', 'enron' and 'w ikivote', respectively. The 'hepth' and 
'wikivote' datasets were taken d irectly from the Stanford  Large Network Dataset Colle ction 
(SNAP) website (available at http:/ / snap.stanford .edu / data/ ). In the case of the 'enron' 
dataset, we processed  the data ourselves from the mysql dump file available at 
http:/ / www.isi.edu/ ~adibi/ Enron/ Enron.htm . In Table 2 we see the basic statistics for the 
three graphs datasets. We note the relatively low average clustering coefficient for the 
'wikivote' dataset, and the relatively low average degree, high average path length, high 
d iameter and large number of communities for the 'hepth' dataset.  
TABLE 2 
SUMMARY OF GRAPH STATISTICS FOR THE TEST DATASETS* 
 hepth enron wikivote 
#Nodes 9877 10630 7115 
#Edges 51971 329674 103689 
Avg. degree 5.259 31.014 28.324 
Clust. coef. 0.471 0.384 0.141 
Avg. path length 5.945 3.160 3.247 
Diameter 18 9 7 
Nº communities 472 51 40 
  *All statistics have been calculated  using the Gephi software on the original datasets used. 
6.2 Benchmark methods and Experiments 
Five contrasting methods are benchmarked, which have been previously described in Section 
4. These consist of two modification methods, 'modif_g' and 'modif_r_l2' and three clustering 
methods, 'clust_g', 'clu st_r_l1' and 'clust_r_l2'. We apply the given methods to the datasets 
stated  in Section 6.1, to generate four anonymized  graph datasets, corresponding to k=2, 4, 8 
and 16. Then to each of these datasets and to the original dataset we apply calculate the graph 
statistics defined  in Section 5.1 in order to compute the information loss. Finally, to the same 
datasets we apply the five adversary queries defined in Section 5.3 in order to calcu late the 
risk. This enables us to evaluate the relative performance of the five perturbation methods, 
from different perspectives: information loss metrics, adversary queries, dataset characteri s-
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7 EMPIRICAL TESTING AND RESULTS 
In this Section we present the results for information loss and adversary success for the d iffe r-
ent methods, metrics and datasets.  
7.1 Information Loss Vs anonymization (k) level 
For the metrics of Fig. 3 (degree, cc and apl) and the first two metrics of Fig. 4 (hub and 
bridge), the information loss is quantified  by first calculating the graph metrics for the d iffe r-
ent graph datasets corresponding to k=0, k=2, k=4, k=8 and k=16. Then we correlate the value 
for each metric for the k=0 dataset with each of the other datasets (k=2, …). The d ifference 
between the correlations is then interpreted  as the information loss. For the third  metric of Fig. 
4, ‘number of communities’, the absolu te values are plotted  and compared. In Figs. 3 and  4 we 
depict the information loss for progressively increasing anonymization  levels: that is, increas-
ing values of k. In Fig. 3 we correlate the d istribution of the characteristic (for examp le, degree) 
in the original dataset with the d istribution of the characteristic in the anonymized d ataset (for 
example, k=2). In the first row of Fig. 3 we observe that, for degree, all methods follow a simi-
lar trajectory. 'modif_g' d isplays the smallest change for increasing values of k, and  hence it is 
the method with the least information loss for the 'degree' metric. The trends are very similar 
for each of the three datasets. In the second row of Fig. 3 (clustering coefficient metric) we 
again see that 'modif_g' suffers the least information lost whereas 'clust' shows the most. We 
see the other three (restricted) methods with an intermediate performance, the relative pos i-
tion varying slightly d epend ing on the dataset. In the third  row of Fig. 3 (average path length 
metric) we see a somewhat d ifferent scenario to degree and clustering coefficient. For this 
metric, the restricted  methods d isplay the least information loss. We also observe that the 
'Wikivote' d ataset suffers a higher information loss in gen eral and the atypical behavior of the 
'clust' method for the 'HepTh' dataset. 
Now turning to Fig. 4, the first row shows the information loss for the 'hub' metric. For the 
‘enron’ dataset, ‘clust_r_l1’ and ‘clust_r_l2’ gave the best results, together with ‘clust_g’. For 
the ‘Wikivote’ and ‘hepth’ datasets, ‘modif_r_l2’ gave the least information loss, followed by 
‘clust_r_l1’ and ‘clust_r_l2’. The 'Wikivote' dataset suffers the highest information loss. In the 
second  row of Fig. 4 we see the information loss for the 'bridge' statistic. We observe that the 
'wikivote' dataset has again given the greatest information loss, with the value losing practi-
cally all its correlation for all methods with the exception of 'modif_r_l2'. This is similar to the 
result for the average path length (apl) and the same dataset. This is logical if we consider that 
the bridges 'hold  together' the d ifferent regions of the graphs, hence a loss to the bridges will 
greatly affect the traversal d istan ces across the complete graph. We recall that one of the 
measures we have taken to 'protect' the graph topology is to exclude from aggregation the top  
10% percentile, for the restricted  methods. In the case of the 'hepth' dataset this seems to have 
worked relatively well, with an information loss of between 40 and 50% for k=16. In the case 
of the 'enron' dataset, the information loss also compares favorably for the restricted  methods, 
with respect to the non-restricted  methods which have no protection for bridges. The reasons 
for the poorer performance for 'wikivote' must be topological, and could  be rela ted  to a higher 
proportion of significant brid ging nodes which are however not in the top 10% percentile. 
The final row of Fig. 4 shows the raw  values of a graph metric which is specifically related  
to the community structure of the graph: number of communities. We are particularly inter-
ested  in this feature and have expressly implemented  restrictions on the perturbation to pr o-
tect the overall 'community structure' of the graph, as described p reviously. In the third  row  
of Fig. 4 we see the effect of increasing k on the number of communities. We see that the re-
stricted  methods give much better results than the non-restricted  ones, in terms of the change 
in the number of communities, for increasing levels of k. We see in all cases that the 'clust' 
(unrestricted ) method d isplays the highest information loss. For the 'Wikivote' dataset, the 
'modif_g' method d isplayed an atypical behavior for k=2. We take note that the 'hepth' dataset 
has approx. 10 times as many community partitions as the other two datasets. In summary of 
these results, we can conclude that the measures taken to protect the community structure 
have worked as expected , minimizing the change in the corresponding key characteristic.  
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Fig. 3. Information Loss: graph characteristics. Effect of anonymization on three key graph characteristics for 
three different datasets. The figures show the degree of correlation (y-axis) between the original data and per-
turbed data for different values of k (x-axis). Five perturbation methods are shown:  'clust_r_l2', 'clust_r_l1', 






















Fig. 4. Information Loss: community characteristics. Effect of anonymization on two three restricted charac-
teristics (hub and bridge metrics, and number of communities) for three different datasets. The figures show the 
raw data values (y-axis) for different values of k (x-axis). Five perturbation methods are shown:  'clust_r_l2', 
'clust_r_l1', 'clust_g', 'modif_g' and 'modif_r_l2'. 
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In Tables 3 and 4 we see a quantified  summary of the relative performance of the methods, in 
terms of the number of times they were first, second, third  or fourth best in each of th e 18 
cases shown in Figs. 3 and 4. If two methods gave a tie, for example, for first position for a 
given case, both methods were awarded one point for first position.  
We conclude that ‘modif_r_l2’ is the clear overall winner, followed by ‘clust_r_l1’. Ho wever, 
for the ‘degree’ and ‘cc’ metrics, ‘modif_g’ (an unrestricted  method) gave the least information 
loss.  Hence, we can conclude that the restrictions (community, hub and bridge) d id  not opt i-
mally mitigate information loss for the ‘degree’ and ‘clu stering coefficient’ metrics. However, 
as can be seen from Table 3, they d id  so for the other four metrics. Thus, we see that some of 
the relative performances are dataset and metric dependent. 
TABLE 3 






modif_g clust_g modif_r_l2 
degree 3.7 3.0 1.0 3.3 2.0 
cc 3.0 3.7 1.0 5.0 2.3 
apl 2.0 2.0 2.7 4.0 1.3 
hub 2.0 2.0 3.7 4.0 1.3 
bridge 3.0 2.0 3.7 4.7 1.0 
NC 1.3 1.0 2.3 3.3 1.3 
Avg. 2.5 2.3 2.4 4.1 1.6 
TABLE 4 






modif_g clust_g modif_r_l2 
enron 2.5 2.0 2.5 3.8 1.7 
wikivote 2.5 2.7 2.3 4.2 1.3 
hepth 2.5 2.2 2.3 4.2 1.7 
Avg. 2.5 2.3 2.4 4.1 1.6 
7.2 Risk (adversary information) Vs anonymization (k) level 
The risk is quantified  by applying five d ifferent adversary queries, as we have previously 
described in Section 5.3. The risk is measured  in terms of candidate set sizes, following the 
guidelines of Hay[1]. That is, the highest risk exists for nodes for the lowest candidate set size 
(=1), whereas the lowest risk exists for nodes for the highest candidate set size. Throughout 
the following text we will use the term ‘bucket’ as a synonym for ‘candidate set’.  
In Figs. 5 and  6 the risk is plotted  for each of the adversary queries, for each dataset and for 
increasing values of k. For space restrictions, only the lowest risk  candidate set (bucket) is 
shown for each adversary query. However, in the text we comment the proportions in the 
other buckets, whenever significant. The proportion of nodes in the lowest risk bucket is a key 
indicator of risk and was the bucket which best characterized  the adversary queries and 
methods.  
The buckets for adversary queries 1, 2, 4 and 5 were defined with the following frequencies: 
‘=1’, ‘2-4’, ‘5-10’, ’11-20’ and ‘>20’. For adversary query 3 (edges), the following buckets were 
defined: ‘=1’, ‘2-10’, ’11-100’, ‘101-1000’ and ‘>1000’.  
We also make clear that the candidate sets are based  on the number of nodes returned by 
the adversary queries for the anonymized graphs. This gives a vision from the viewpoint of 
the adversary. We observe that, for the clustering methods, each node (supernode) returned 
will contain a minimum of k and  a maximum of 2k-1 basic nodes (see Section 5.2). Hence, for 
k=16, every aggregated  (super) node contains between 16 and 31 elemental nodes of the origi-
nal graph. Therefore, although to the adversary it appears that s/ he has found a unique node 
in the graph, this node really contains between 16 and  31 elemental nodes. Internally (not 
published), we know how many basic nodes each supernode contains and this is used  to place 
it in the correspond ing frequency bucket. In the case of the modification methods, for each 
node there will be at least k-1 identical nodes in the graph. Hence, when an adversary query 
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returns one node, its frequency will be equal to the number of nodes, which will be at least k-
1, labeled  as being identical to it in the graph . In likelihood terms, if the adversary is trying to 
identify a specific node (for example, corresponding to user 'john'), and the query returns a 
single node, then the chances of that node being that of 'john'  will be at least 1/k. 
7.2.1 Adversary query 1: vertex refinement H 1(x) 
Fig. 5 (row 1) shows the trends for the d ifferent candidate sets, datasets and values of k, for the 
first adversary query, vertex refinement H 1(x). We recall that this query simply returns the 
degree of a given node. If we first consider Fig. 5 (row 1) in terms of the proportion of nodes 
in each candidate set, we observe for all original datasets (k=0) that the great majority (90%) of 
the degree values are in the highly frequent candidate set ('>20', low risk), and the remaining 
10% are d istributed  through the other, higher risk candidate sets, '=1', '2-4', '5-10' and '11-20'.  
In the case of the bucket ’11-20’, all methods follow ed a similar trend with the exception of 
'clust_g' which followed a markedly upward  gradient, giving a significantly higher relative 
proportion of nodes in the bucket '11-20', with respect to the other methods. Also, 'modif_g' 
d isplayed a slightly d ifferent tendency, with a relatively lower proportion of nodes in the 
bucket for the 'enron' and 'w ikivote' datasets. We note that for k=16, there will be zero nodes 
in the '=1', '2-4' and '5-10' buckets.  
If we now look at Fig. 5 (row 1), we see that  all methods follow a similar trend, with the 
exception of 'clust_g' which shows a lower proportion of nodes in the '>20' bucket, with re-
spect to the other methods. 
7.2.2 Adversary query 2: vertex refinement H2(x) 
Fig. 5 (row 2) shows the trends for the d ifferent candidate sets, datasets and values of k, for the 
second adversary query, vertex refinement H 2(x). We recall that this query returns the degrees 
(in a vector) of each of the immediate neighbors of a given node. For the bucket ’11-20’, the 
proportion remained  low until k=16, which is when all the nodes from the previous bucket 
('5-10') appeared  in bucket '11-20'. In terms of the methods, all methods follow a similar trend 
for all three datasets, with the exception of bucket '>20' and dataset 'hepth'. In this last case the 
'clust_g' method d isplay a progressively decreasing proportion in contrast to all other 
methods. Also, we can see that the 'modif_r_l2' and ‘clust_r_l1’ methods d isplay a slightly 
higher relative proportion of nodes for the 'wikivote' and 'hepth' datasets and the '>20' bucket.  
7.2.3 Adversary query 3: subgraph edge query SG(x) 
Fig. 5 (row 3) shows the trends for the d ifferent candidate sets, datasets and valu es of k, for the 
third  adversary qu ery, subgraph SG(x). We recall that this query returns the number of edges 
in the subgraph formed by the immediate neighbors of a given node.  Firstly we note that the 
candidate set size ranges are d istinct from those of the degree (Fig. 5, row 1) and neighbor 
degrees (Fig. 5, row 2). This is because the magnitude of the value 'number  of edges' for the 
subgraph considered  is much greater than the degree values. Hence the set sizes reflect this, 
with the biggest set size (lowest risk) set to '>1000'. The set sizes were assigned by observing 
the d istributions for each dataset of the number of edges. We were also initially guided by the 
ranges used  by Hay in [1] for the edge fact.   
In general we see similar trends for the d ifferent d atasets and buckets, with the following 
exceptions: for the 'hepth ' dataset the 'clust_g' method d isplays a  higher relative proportion of 
nodes in bucket '101-1000' and a much lower relative proportion of nodes in bucket '>1000', 
with respect to the other methods; also, the 'modif_g' method shows a d istinctive trend in 
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Fig. 5. Risk, Adversary Queries on degree (vertex refinement H1(x)),  degrees of neighbors (vertex re-
finement H2(x) and edges (subgraph query SG(x). Effect of anonymization on risk for candidate sets '>20' 
(degrees and degrees of neighbors) and ‘>1000’ (edges), for three different datasets. The figures show the 
percentage of nodes (y-axis) in a given candidate set bucket for different values of k (x-axis). Three clustering 














Fig. 6. Risk, Hub and Bridge Fingerprints with visibility horizon of 2. Effect of anonymization on risk for 
candidate set '>20', for three different datasets. The figures show the percentage of nodes (y-axis) in a given 
candidate set bucket for different values of k (x-axis). Three clustering based and two modification based per-
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7.2.4 Adversary query 4: hub fingerprint F2(x, H) 
Fig. 6 (row 1) shows the trends for the d ifferent candidate sets, datasets and values of k, for the 
fourth adversary query, hub fingerprint (See Section 5.3). We recall that th is query returns a 
vector of the shortest path length to a fixed  set of 10 top hubs in the graph. The ‘hub’ value for 
each node is quantified  by calculating the HITS 'Hub Update Rule’ me tric, as commented  in 
Section 5.1. With respect to the original datasets (k=0), we observe that the majority of the 
vector frequencies are in the '>20' cand idate set, initially containing approx. 69% of the nodes 
for 'enron', 63% for 'wikivote' and 92% for 'hepth'. As a result of anonymization up to k=16, in 
general we see an increase in the '>20' low risk set. In terms of the methods, for bucket '11-20', 
'modif_g' d isplayed the lowest relative proportion. With reference to Fig. 6 (row 1), for bucket 
'>20', 'modif_g' shows the highest relative proportion whereas 'clust_g' d isplays the lowest or 
equal lowest. 
7.2.5 Adversary query 5: bridge fingerprint F2(x, B) 
Fig. 6 (row 2) shows the trends for candidate set ‘>20’, datasets and  values of k, for the fifth 
and final adversary query, bridge fingerprint. We recall that this query  returns a vector of the 
shortest path length to a fixed  set of 10 top bridges in the graph. The ‘bridge’ value for each 
node is quantified  by calculating the ‘bridge centrality’ metric, as commented  in Section 5.1.  
With respect to the original datasets (k=0), we observe that the majority of the vector fre-
quencies are in the '>20' candidate set. This bucket initially contains approx. 92% of the nodes 
for 'enron', 80% for 'wikivote' and 99% for 'hepth'. The ‘hepth’ has the most ‘extreme’ cand i-
date set membership in which practically all the nodes are in the '>20' set. This d istribution is 
somewhat d istinct from the ‘hub fingerprint’ query, which had approx. 20% less nodes in the 
'>20' set and approx. 40% of the remainder d istributed  among the mid -range sets, for the ‘en-
ron’ and wikivote’ dataset. In terms of the methods, we see a sim ilar behavior for the d ifferent 
methods, with the following exceptions: 'clust_g' has a higher proportion of nodes in bucket 
'11-20' for k=16 and the wikivote and hepth datasets; 'clu st_g' also has a progressively lower 
proportion of nodes for the '>20' bucket; 'modif_g', on the other hand, tends to show a slightly 
lower percentage for the ’11-20’ bucket and a slightly higher one for the ‘>20’ bucket, relative 
to the other methods. 
7.2.6 Summary and synthesis of the analysis of the adversary query results (Sections 7.2.1 to 
7.2.5) 
In this Section we will present an overall picture of the results of the d ifferent adversary qu e-
ries, taking into account the detailed  analysis which we have already seen in Sections 7.2.1 to 
7.2.5. In order to synthesize the results in a quant itative manner, we will rank the methods 
and datasets, in terms of their performance for increasing values of k and  adversary query 
type. We will use the candidate set with the highest number of candidates (lowest risk) as the 
benchmark. It is clear that the more candidates that fall into this category the better because 
they will have the lowest identification risk. We will follow the same evaluation method as we 
d id  for the information loss in Section 7.1. 
TABLE 5 








H1(x) 1.0 1.0 1.7 2.7 1.3 
H2(x) 3.3 1.3 4.0 4.7 1.7 
SG(x) 2.3 1.0 2.7 4.3 2.3 
F2(x, H) 3.3 3.3 1.0 4.7 2.0 
F2(x, B) 2.7 3.0 1.0 4.3 3.0 
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TABLE 6 








enron 2.4 2.0 2.4 4.2 2.0 
wikivote 2.6 1.6 2.0 4.0 2.6 
hepth 2.6 2.2 1.8 4.2 1.6 
Rank 3 1 2 4 2 
 
In Tables 5 and 6 we see a quantified  summary of the relative performance of the methods, in 
terms of the number of times they were first, second, third  or fourth best in each of the 15 
cases shown in Figs. 5 and 6. If two methods gave a tie, for example, for first position for a 
given case, both methods were awarded one point for first position. In these terms we see that 
‘clust_r_l1’' is the overall winner followed by 'modif_r_l2' and ‘modif_g’. In summary, and 
with reference to Table 5, we observe that for the first three adversary queries (first three rows 
of Table 5), the restricted  and clustering methods (excluding ‘clust_g’) gave the lowest risk. 
However, for the last two adversary queries (hub and bridge fingerprints), the non -restricted  
method  ‘modif_g’ gave the lowest risk. This can be explained by taking into account that the 
restricted  methods do not perturb the top percentile hubs and bridges.  
8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented  and tested  two main methods for perturbing a graph, based  on node mod-
ification and node clu stering,  combined with a set of restrictions which mitigate the effect of 
the perturbation, and hence the information loss, on key graph characteristics: community 
structure, hubs and  bridges. We have seen that in terms of risk, the restricted  methods gave 
the best results for the degree, neighbor degree and edge adversary queries. On the other 
hand, the unrestricted  method (modif_g) gave the best results for the hub and bridge finge r-
print adversary queries. This has been commented  in Section 7.2.6. 
In terms of information loss, the best method varies depending on the metric used , and in 
some cases on the dataset characteristics.  The 'modif_g' (unrestricted) method was best for the 
degree and clustering coefficient metr ics, for all datasets; 'modif_r_l2' was best for the Hub 
and Bridge metrics and was also best for the APL metric with the exception of the WikiVote 
dataset; 'clu st_r_l1' was best or tied  best for the NC (number of commun ities) metric for all 
datasets and came second best for all metrics except ‘degree’ and ‘cc’. Hence, we can conclude 
that the restricted  methods gave lower information loss in general (4 out of 6 metrics) and 
lower risk for 3 out of 5 of the adversary queries. The modification based method ‘modif_r_l2’ 
gave the lowest overall information loss whereas ‘clust_r_l2’ gave the lowest overall risk, with 
‘modif_r_l2’ a close second. A general summary can be seen in Table 7. 
 
TABLE 7  
GRAPH CHARACTERISTICS VS BEST PERFORMING METHODS 
 Enron HepTh WikiVote 
Dataset  
characteristics 
High D, high CC, low 
NC, v. high ACS 
High D, low CC,  
low NC, high ACS 
Low D, high CC,  






























*D=degree, CC=Clustering Coefficient, NC=number of communities, ACS=average community size, APL=Average Path Length. 
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